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中国上市公司超额现金持有与过度投资的关系研究
Research on the Relationship between Excess Cash-holdings and Over-investment of Chinese Listed Companies

导  师: 陆正华

学科专业: 120202

授予学位: 硕士

作  者: ;

机构地区: 华南理工大学

摘  要: 现金是企业至关重要的财务资源,对企业的经营、投资、融资等各方面的行为有着重大影响,并与企业的经营业绩息息相关。根据权衡理论,企业持有的现金处于最优水平,但是在不完善的资本市场条件下,由于受到信息不对称、委托代理问题等因素的影响,企业的内外部融资成本会产生差异,内部持有现金是一种最廉价、最直接的融资方式,因此企业会倾向于内部持有大量现金,乃至超过最优现金持有量,从而导致严重的代理问题,并将引起过度投资行为。另一方面,由于不同企业受到的外部融资约束程度不同,在企业的超额现金持有与过度投资的关系上,不同的企业也表现出不同的特征。 本文以企业超额现金持有与过度投资的关系为研究主线,并加入了融资约束因素,考察了在不同融资约束程度下二者之间关系的差异。以我国A股1111家上市公司2006-2010年的数据为样本,结合我国国情,分别选取利息保障倍数、股利支付率、终极控制人性质、资产规模、公司类型五个指标作为衡量融资约束程度的替代变量,通过对全样本以及分组样本数据进行描述性统计、相关性检验和多元线性回归等处理,多角度地深入探讨了我国上市公司超额现金持有与过度投资的关系,揭示了上市公司在面临不同程度的外部融资约束时,超额现金持有引起的过度投资行为也更加严重。 本文的主要结论是:(1)我国上市公司存在最优现金持有量;(2)超额现金持有与过度投资之间存在明显的正相关关系,持有现金越多,过度投资行为越明显;(3)融资约束程度不同的公司,超额现金持有对过度投资的影响程度存在显著的差异;利息保障倍数分组下,融资约束程度低的公司超额现金持对与过度投资的影响程度明显高于融资约束程度较高的公司;股利支付率分组下,融资约束程度低的公司,因为支付股利反而抑制了过度投资行为;终极控制人分组下,地方所属企业相对于中央所属企业和民营企业超额现金持有更容易引起过度投资行为;资产规模分组下,随着资产规模的增加,企业超额现金持有更容易导致过度投资的行为;公司类型分组下,相对非集团公司而言,集团公司的超额持有现金更倾向于过度投资行为。最后,本文提出了相关政策建议,在宏观层面上,应加强政府对资本市场的监管和对融资约束程度高的企业的扶持;在微观层面上,努力提高现金流的投资效率,硬化预算约束,优化资本结构,强化信息披露。 Cash is a very important financial resource of an enterprise, it has a significant influenceon the enterprise management, investment, financing and other aspects, and it is linked withthe management of the enterprise performance closely. According to the balance theory, whenthe enterprise has cash in the optimal level, but under the not perfect capital market conditions,due to the asymmetric information and principal-agent or the other influence of factors, theenterprise internal and external financing costs will produce the difference, internal cash heldis a kind of the most cheap, the most direct financing, so enterprise will tend to internal hold alarge amount of cash, and even more than the optimal cash holdings, which can lead tosignificant agency issues, and will cause over-investment behavior. On the other hand, due tothe different enterprises are external financing constraints different degrees, in the relationshipof the over-investment and excess cash-holdings, different enterprise also show differentcharacteristics. In this paper the enterprise with the relationship between the excess cash-holdings andover-investment for the study of the main line, and joined the financing constraints factors,examines the financing constraints in different degrees between the different of therelationship. As our country the1111A listed companies on the2006-2010years of data assamples, and combined with actual situation in China, selecting the multiple of interestsafeguard, dividend payment rates and ultimate control nature, asset scales, the companytype,the five index as a measure of financing constraints degree of substitution variables,through to the samples and sample data packet descriptive statistics, relevance inspection andmultiple linear regression processing, from different directions, and probes into the listedcompanies in China is the relationship between the excess cash-holdings and over-investment,and reveals the listed companies in the face of the different levels of external financingconstraints, the over-investment behavior by excess cash-holdings caused is more serious. The main conclusion is:/(1/) our listed enterprises have the best cash holdings;/(2/) theover-investment and excess cash-holdings have significant positive correlation, the more cashheld, the more obvious over-investment behaviors;/(3/) among the financing constraintsdifferent degrees of company, the amount of cash-holdings of the now investing too much influence degree of remarkable differences; The multiple of interest safeguard group, the lowdegree of financing constraints of excess cash for the company to over-investment was higherthan the influence degree of the financial constraint level higher company; Dividend paymentrate group, the low degree of financing constraints of the company, because pay dividends tosuppress the over-investment behavior instead; The ultimate control group, the local affiliatedcompanies relative central subordinate enterprise and private enterprise the forehead is nowmore likely to lead to cash have over-investment behavior; Asset scale groups, with theincrease of the asset scale, the amount of cash-holdings is the more likely to lead toover-investment behavior; In the company type group, the group company in relative, thegroup company of the excess cash held more inclined to over-investment behavior. Finally,this paper puts forward relevant policy Suggestions, in the macro level, government shouldgive more strengthen to the capital market supervision and high degree of financingconstraints of the support of the enterprise; In the micro level, companies should make effortsto improve the investment efficiency of cash flow, harden budget constraints, optimize capitalstructure, and strengthen the information disclosure.

关 键 词: 超额现金持有 过度投资 融资约束

分 类 号: [F275.1 F224]

领  域: [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]

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