导　　师： 李映照

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 机构投资者对上市公司治理影响的研究在以往研究中已经有所涉及，并得出结论机构投资者已经逐渐参与到公司治理的很多方面，机构投资者持股可以有效地制约公司盈余管理，有效促进公司研发投入，提高信息披露质量水平等等。然而少有研究对机构投资者持股策略的倾向和偏好进行研究。上市公司成长性是否影响机构投资者持股策略？不同持股行为特征的机构投资者的持股策略影响因素有哪些不同？ 本文从机构投资者角度，首先将机构投资者持股比例总和作为被解释变量，研究公司成长性是否影响其持股策略的做出。本文将公司股票的流动性，市值，公司风险系数Beta，公司治理结构，股权制衡作用，控股股东性质和信息披露水平等方面作为控制变量。其次，根据机构投资者的持股行为特征（持股集中度，持股周转率，持股敏感度）进行分类，通过主成分分析和聚类分析将机构投资者分为两类。最后分别将两类机构投资者的持股比例总和作为被解释变量，研究不同种类机构投资者持股行为的影响因素。 使用实证数据研究表明，机构投资者作为整体与公司成长性关系并不显著，投资组合决策倾向于公司规模大，信息披露程度高，董事会规模大，独立董事占比多，第二大股东到第十大股东制衡作用强，市场风险低的上市公司。本文借鉴Bushee（1998）对机构投资者的分析方法，使用因子分析和聚类分析方法得出有14.54/%的积极机构投资者持股集中度高，持股周转率低且持股敏感度低。进一步地，对不同类型的机构投资者进行回归分析，发现积极机构投资者具有“成长性敏感性”，而消极机构投资者不具有。消极机构投资者对公司成长性，公司治理机制，控股股东的性质关系都不显著，与其持股行为特征对应相关。相对“宽松”，内控不够严格的公司治理结构更有利于经理层开展短期行为，创造短期效益，这也正好迎合了消极机构投资者投机的心理倾向。政策可以有意识对积极机构投资者持股进行激励，引导资本市场的良性运行。 In the previous studies，there are many researches about the impacts of institutionalinvestors on the the governance of listed companies, with the conclusions that institutionalinvestors has gradually participated in the corporate governance, and the ownership of theinstitutional can effectively restrict earnings management, effectively promote R/&Dinvestment, improve the quality of information disclosure and so on. However, few studiesare about the tendencies and preferences of institutional investors holding strategy. Whetherthe growth of the listed have the effects on the ownership strategies of institutional investors?What are the different factors influencing that different behavioral characteristics ofinstitutional investors’ holding strategy? From the perspective of institutional investors, the research is focus on the effect of thegrowth on their shareholding strategies. At the same time, this research takes the proxies thatstock volume as the company's liquidity, market capitalization, the company risk index /(Beta/),corporate governance, stock balances, the nature of the controlling shareholder andinformation disclosure level as control variables. Then the paper divides the institutionalaccording to the Holding behavior characteristics /(ownership concentration, ownershipturnover, holding sensitivity/), and using the statistics tool:“Principal component analysis andcluster analysis” to classify the different institutional investors. Empirical data has shown that, if take the institutional investors as a whole, they are notsignificant on the company's growth relationship. However, the regression results show thatinstitutional investors’ portfolio decisions tend to the companies with large scale, high degreeof information disclosure, big board size, proportion of independent directors, the checks andbalances role of the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest shareholders, low-riskmarket listed companies. In this paper, according on Bushee /(1998/) analysis of theinstitutional investors, they are classified as active institutional investors and passiveinstitutional investors, using the data statistics tool making the factor analysis and clusteranalysis methods. The result showed that14.54percent are active institutional investors,holding high concentration of ownership, low turnover rate and low transaction sensitivity.Further, for different types of institutional investors, the paper makes the regression analysisrespectively, with the founding that active institutional investors are passive significantly withgrowth sensitivity, while institutional investors do not have. After classification, theownerships of active investors have significantly relationships with whether independence between the manager of the company and chairman of the board, the largest proportion ofshareholding, the nature of controlling shareholder; positive institutional investors tend to getthe share that have independent investment manager and chairman, low proportion of thelargest shareholder, the non-state-owned controlling shareholder. Corresponding to itsshareholding characteristics, passive institutional investors’ ownership is not significant onthe growth of the corporate, corporate governance mechanism, the nature of the controllingshareholder. Relatively 'loose' corporate governance structure and less stringent internalcontrols are more conducive to the managers to carry out short-term behavior, and createshort-term benefits, which also meet the psychological tendency of passive institutionalinvestors speculative. Policy can have a sense of motivation to guide positive institutionalinvestors holding, with the goal to optimise the operation of capital markets.

关 键 词： 机构投资者 成长性 异质性

分 类 号： [F276.6 F224]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]