导　　师： 廖卫东

学科专业： B0104

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 江西财经大学

摘　　要： 近年来,我国不断有食品安全事件发生,给我国政府信誉和消费者权益造成重大损失,食品安全监管问题已经成为我国急需解决的社会问题之一,特别是2008年惊动海内外的“三鹿奶粉”三聚氰胺超标致婴幼儿中毒事件,将食品安全监管问题推上了风口浪尖。 基于我国食品安全事件频发的背景,食品监管有关的话题成为学术界一度讨论的热点,现在看来研究热情还在升温。我们结合现阶段的我国发展战略分析表明,消费者保护具有重要的时代意义,因为维护消费者权益本身就是“以人为本”思想的应有之意,也是我国构建社会主义和谐社会的重要组成部分。本文用到的经济学理论包括外部性、信息不对称、公共品、制度变迁等等,采用的研究方法主要有比较制度分析,历史分析,博弈分析等。 笔者通过阅读国内外现有文献发现,学界针对食品安全监管问题研究的成果十分丰富,研究视角也五花八门,但专门从消费者权益保护的角度来讨论食品安全监管问题的文献很少,最起码在国内不多见。本文的研究目的是想从理论上说明消费者保护的重要性,以及深刻揭示在消费者保护缺失的情况下,仅从政府监管层和生产者两方着眼构建我国食品安全监管体系将会是缺乏效率的,文中结论表明我们做到了。一般认为,我们加强食品安全监管的目的是保护消费者权益,与之不同的是,本文研究表明,消费者保护不仅是食品监管的目的之一,也是我们完善监管体系,提高监管效率的必要条件,因此我们认为,消费者保护与加强食品安全监管两者互相促进,互为目的,加强消费者保护可以促进监管效率,完善监管体系也可以进一步加强消费者保护。因此,消费者保护始终是我们加强和完善我国食品安全监管体的核心问题,必须贯穿整个监管过程的始终。 本文运用经济学基本理论并结合我国正处于转型期的基本国情,深刻分析了食品安全监管会失灵的原因,并且根据我国食品消费者权益保护缺失的现实情况,假定我国食品消费者是弱势群体,没有话语权,或者由于司法不利,消费者申诉成功概率很小,而申诉成本却很大,他们在利益博弈的格局中基本没有发生作用,因此,我们认为他们不参与博弈,不是食品利益博弈的主体。本文通过构建消费者缺位的条件下食品生产厂商与监管者之间的完全信息动态博弈模型,计算出了子博弈精炼纳什均衡解,即厂商选择过度造假,监管者事后过度监管。我们发现该结论与我国食品行业事后监管模式的现实后果高度吻合,具有很强的解释力,并且将其与帕累托最优解相比较,说明了次优均衡产生的原因,从博弈机制的理论角度说明了消费者保护缺失情况下会给我国带来的监管效率损失,从另一方面反映出消费者权益保护的必要性和重要性。文中笔者还对几个代表性的国家在食品安全监管中如何保护消费者进行了比较,得到了有益的结论,最后在分析国内实际情况和借鉴国际食品监管成功经验的基础上,提出了我国进行食品安全监管制度建设的对策。 In recent years, there are many incidents of food safety, which cause significant loss of the credibility of our government and consumer rights. The regulation of food safety has become one of urgent social problems that our government needs to solve.Especially, the incident that the content of melamine in Sanlu milk powder goes beyond the limit and leads to many infants poisoning in 2008 make the regulation of food safety much more urgent. As the incident of food safety happens frequently, the topic of food monitoring becomes a hot topic in academic research.It seems that the interest of researchers is still warming now.The analysis which combine with our development strategy show that the protection of consumers'benefits has important significance, because the protection of consumer'interests is the main content of the thinking of 'people-oriented' and is an important part of the building the socialist harmonious society in China.Economic theories that are used in this dissertation include externality, Information asymmetry, public product, institutional transition etc.And the main research methods used in this dissertation are comparative institutional analysis, historical analysis, and game analysis. After reading the existing literatures at home and abroad, the author finds that the research results of monitoring for food safety is very rich and the research angle is also varied, but there are few literatures at home discuss the regulation of food safety from the angle of the protection of consumer'benefit.The purpose of this paper is to explain the importance of consumer protection in theory and to reveal that it will be inefficiency to construct the food safety controlling system focusing only on the government regulators and producers, but ignoring the consumer protection.It is generally recognized that our aim of strengthening food safety is to protect the interests of consumers. Differently, this study shows that consumer protection is not only one of the objectives of food regulation but also a necessary condition for improving our regulatory system and promoting the efficiency of supervision.Therefore,we believe that consumer protection and strengthening food safety supervision are both mutual promotions and mutual purpose.Strengthening consumer protection regulation can promote efficiency of supervision and improving the regulatory system can also strengthen consumer protection. Thus,consumer protection has always been the core issue of enhancing and improving our food safety regulatory system, and it must be run through the entire regulatory process. This paper utilizes the basic economic theories and combins with he basic national conditions that our country is in transition.It analyses profoundly the reasons of the failure of food safety regulatory. According to the reality that our country is lack of food consumer protection,Ⅰassume that consumers are vulnerable groups whitout discourse power,or because of adverse judicial they have small probability of success in consumer complaints and the cost is great.They did not militate in the basic pattern of the game,accordingly,we believe that they are not in the game and they are not the food interests of the game subject.In this paper, under the condition of the absence of consumers,Ⅰbulid a model of dynamic game of complete information between the food manufacturers and regulators to calculate solution of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.The solution is that companies over forge and regulators over regulate afterwards.We found that this conclusion is highly consistent with the real consequences of afterwards monitoring pattern of food industry, and that it has strong explanatory power. The author compare it with Pareto optimal solution and then illustrate the causes of sub-optimal equilibrium.It shows from the game system's theoretical point of view that the lack of consumer protection will bring our regulatory efficiency losses, and on the other hand, it reflects the necessity and importance of consumer protection.The author also compares several representative countries in food safety supervision in how to protect consumers and have useful conclusions.Finally, basing on the actual situation of domestic and referring to the successful experience of international food regulatory, the author gives some advice and makes a few suggestions for the construction of food safety regulatory system. Of course, this paper also have inadequacy.Firstly,it doesn't acquired enough foreign literature; Secondly,the form of mode in chapter three is beautiful,and the conclusions are highly consistent with the facts,but there is further room for improvement in assumptions of the model.We assume that consumers are either in the game,or not in the game.In fact,the role of consumers is not only these two cases.Between participation and non-participation there are many areas,such as different levels of participation.Apart frpm this,the model is under the assumption of perfect information,and it assumes that regulators and producers have complete rationality which in fact that they may be of bounded rationality.These are areas need to improve in the future;Finally,because of the difficulties of data collection,we can not do empirical test between consumer protection and regulatory efficiency of food safety.

关 键 词： 消费者权益保护 食品安全监管 完全信息动态博弈 子博弈精炼纳什均衡

分 类 号： [F8]

领　　域： [经济管理]