作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 北京大学

出　　处： 《石河子大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》 2004年第2期30-33,共4页

摘　　要： 转轨时期政府安排的金融约束制度造就了垄断的国有银行体系。它使国有银行在市场化改革过程中遭遇了严重的信用风险,也给银行业带来了系统性风险。在菜单成本效应下,国有银行贷款占社会总贷款的较大比重和国有银行资产中较大的贷款比重使贷款市场的风险具有系统性特征。国有银行商业化改革、引进外资银行和发展民营银行,以打破贷款市场的垄断格局等措施,是避免系统性银行风险的制度性应对措施。 In the period of transition the restrained financial institution makes the state-owned bank hold the credit markert.During the course of the transition of commercial bank, the institution brings in credit risk with the formation of problem loan, results in the market risk in the bank system. The over-weighed proportion of the loan from the state-owned bank in the country bank system and the loan in the assets of the state-owned bank by the nonlinear effect induce the systematic risk in the country.In order to solve the problem the government must break the monopoly by way of indraughting the overseas bank,developing the commercial bank and so on.

关 键 词： 转轨 国有银行 系统性金融风险 制度补贴

领　　域： [经济管理]