作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《管理世界》 2004年第2期104-116,共13页

摘　　要： 本文通过对“科龙”和“美的”两个案例的剖析 ,探讨企业产权安排、政企关系、治理机制与企业效率的关系。研究表明 ,产权清晰程度和产权的流动性是产权安排的两个方面 ,我国的产权改革主要是循着产权清晰的方向迈进;作为产权安排的一个极其重要的方面 ,虽然产权清晰并不能必然带来企业效率的提高 ,但却是提高企业长期效率的前提 ,它通过激励、外部竞争等治理机制对企业效率起了决定性的影响 ,同时又决定了不同的治理机制对企业发挥作用的程度 ,即使是相同或相似的治理机制 ,在不同的产权安排下也会产生不同的效果;无产权保障的治理机制也能在特定条件下解决企业的效率问题 ,但却不能永久解决;产权安排不同的变迁路径不仅体现了政府作为大股东的不同理性行为 ,而且也是管理者人力资本和财务资本积累差别的产物。因此 ,通过各种形式的民营化优化企业的产权安排将是公有制企业改革的必然出路 ,而这种优化产权安排的改革能否成功主要取决于多方利益博弈下政府作为大股东的代理行为能否得到有效约束 ,以及管理者的人力资本产权能否得到尊重和确认 ,而管理者是否具备足够的人力资本和财务资本则是这一改革的必要条件。 By the dissection of the two company cases of Kelong and Midea,we will in this article make an exploration into the arrangement of enterprise property rights,the relationship between the governˉment and the enterprise,and the relationship between control mechanism and enterprise efficiency.Our study indicates that the distinctness and liquidity of property right are the two aspects of the arrangeˉment of property right;that China's reform in property right should mainly follow the direction of clearness of property right;that as an extremely important aspect of property right arrangement,the clarity of property right,although unable to inevitably cause the raise of enterprise efficiency,is the prerequisite for increasing enterprise long-term efficiency,because it can,by encouragement and exˉternal competition and other management mechanisms,make a decisive impact upon enterprise effiˉciency,meanwhile it determines the degrees in which different control systems act on enterprises,and even if under the same or similar management system,different arrangement of property right may produce different effect;that although the control system without the guarantee of property right sometimes can also solve the problem of enterprise efficiency under given conditions,it cannot always do so or do so once and for all;and that the different ways to arrange property right not only embody the different rational behavior of the government as the main stockholder,but also the product of difˉference in managers'accumulation of human capital and financial capital.The optimization,therefore,by various forms of privatization,of enterprises'ownership arrangement,will be the inevitable way out of the reform of publicly owned enterprises,and whether the reform of the said optimization will succeed relies mainly on whether the agent behavior of the government as the main stockholder will,under the circumstances that multiple parties attend the game for benefit,be effectively bound and whether the manager's ownership right of human ca

关 键 词： 产权制度 公司治理结构 政企关系 中国 科龙集团 美的集团 家电企业 企业效率 人力资本产权

领　　域： [经济管理]