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风险态度不对称下的企业间知识转移研究
Knowledge Transfer between Enterprises under Asymmetric Risk Attitude

作  者: ; ;

机构地区: 广东财经大学

出  处: 《中国管理科学》 2016年第12期82-90,共9页

摘  要: 知识发送方的风险态度会影响知识流失风险普遍存在的企业间知识转移。为了防控企业间知识转移中的知识流失,考虑知识发送方的风险态度为私有信息,当知识发送方公布虚假风险态度类型,或者知识接收方不相信其公布信息的行为被发现时均会遭受诚信惩罚。利用演化博弈论分析了知识发送方风险态度披露策略和知识接收方信息处理策略的演化均衡,以及其对知识转移的影响,找出了既能最大化双方总收益又能避免知识流失的最佳演化均衡,探讨了实现该均衡的方法,并用算例对结论加以说明。研究表明:知识发送方应结合自身风险态度设置诚信惩罚;诚信惩罚足够大时,一定能实现最佳演化均衡;否则,仅风险厌恶方可能通过增大诚信惩罚,或者选择对其诚信惩罚较大的知识接收方,实现最佳演化均衡。上述结论为企业应如何防控知识转移中的知识流失提供了参考,丰富了企业间知识转移的相关研究成果。 The loss of knowledge is popular in knowledge transfer between enterprises.And the risk attitude of the knowledge sender,which is private information in most cases,always influences the effect of knowledge transfer.In order to prevent the loss of knowledge under these conditions,the risk attitude of the knowledge sender is introduced and assumed as private information.And the knowledge sender who discloses a false risk attitude or the knowledge accepter who doesn't believe the knowledge sender is assumed to be punished.Evolutionary game theory is used to analysis the evolutions of the information disclosure strategy of the knowledge sender and the information processing strategy of the knowledge accepter.By discussing the influences of evolutionary equilibriums on knowledge transfer,the way to realize the best evolutionary equilibrium that can not only maximize the total revenue of the knowledge sender and the knowledge accepter but also avoid the loss of knowledge is found.The conclusions of this paper are further illustrated by numerical simulations.The results show that the knowledge sender should punish the knowledge accepter based on its risk attitude;only when the knowledge sender severely punish the knowledge accepter,can the best evolutionary equilibrium be realized;otherwise,only if the knowledge sender is risk aversion party,may the best evolutionary equilibrium be realized when the knowledge sender punish the knowledge accepter more severely or selects a knowledge accepter who severely punish the knowledge sender.The above findings provide effective suggestions for both sides of knowledge transfer on how to prevent the loss of knowledge during knowledge transfer between enterprises and enrich the related research achievements of knowledge transfer between enterprises.

关 键 词: 知识转移 风险态度 信息不对称 演化博弈

领  域: [经济管理]

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