作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处： 《中国社会科学》 2003年第3期99-112,共14页

摘　　要： 作为社会控制工具的法律 ,本身就是人类历史长期博弈的结果 ,而且往往是富于效率的。然而 ,对中国古代长久存在的连坐和保甲等制度 ,学界普遍持有批评态度。本文应用现代激励理论 ,对这些制度中蕴含的激励原理和连带责任及其施行的不断改进做了剖析。在早期国家的控制能力低下以及信息严重不对称的情况下 ,连坐和保甲制度属于一种强有力的激励方式。在“小政府”的前提下 ,连带责任有效地利用了分散化的信息 ,对维护国家的大一统以及社会稳定起到了重要作用。本文探讨了这些制度的边界、作用以及它们对中国历史上相关制度的影响 ,并对现代中国法中的显性和隐性连带责任做了探讨。本文的一个基本结论是 ,信息成本是决定法律制度有效性的主要因素 ,法律制度应该随信息成本的变化而变化。 As an efficient instrument of social control, law is in itself a result of man's prolonged games. However, Chinese traditional systems such as lian zuo (guilt by association applied to families or a close kin of a criminal) and baojia (household collective security) have long been criticized by the intellectual community. In this article, we examine incentive mechanisms and joint responsibility in these systems, as well as steady improvement in their application. The systems served as an effective incentive mechanism in early times when state control was weak and information flow seriously asymmetrical. Joint responsibility played an important role under a “small government' in maintaining state unity and social stability by making effective use of scattered information. The systems are discussed in the article in terms of their application, their role and their impact on other related systems in Chinese history. We also explore the implicit and explicit joint responsibility in the modern Chinese legal system, concluding that information costs play a key role in determining the effectiveness of the legal system.

关 键 词： 中国 古代法律 连坐制度 保甲制度 连带责任 激励机制 信息成本 行为 效用

领　　域： [政治法律]