机构地区: 深圳大学管理学院
出 处: 《深圳大学学报(理工版)》 2003年第1期15-21,共7页
摘 要: 针对单一层次代理关系分析企业集团内部代理问题的缺陷 ,建立存在于集团内部资本市场中的两层代理模型 ,阐释成员企业经理的寻租行为是如何影响集团总部决策者的投资分配行为 .由模型的均衡解可知 ,成员企业之间的生产率差异越大 ,投资分配扭曲的可能性就越高 . In order to overcome the shortcomings, the single-layer agency relation analyses of agency problems within enterprise group have been brought up. Two-tiered agency models in the internal capital market are set up , and how rent-seeking behaviors of member firms' managers affect investment allocation decision made by headquarters manager is demonstrated. From equilibrium solutions of the model, it's inferred that the larger the divergence of member firm's productivity is, the higher the probability of investment allocation distortion it is.