作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《金融评论》 2014年第5期70-83,124,共15页

摘　　要： "柠檬"问题关系到资本市场的有效运作,而近期兴起的股票期权使高管薪酬激励成为热门话题,不过现有文献对高管薪酬激励如何影响市场的交易成本却鲜有涉及。本文通过构建详细的分析框架,利用高频数据和因子分析方法,从高管薪酬激励这一特定的内部治理出发,深入探讨了其对"柠檬"问题的解决和对交易成本的影响状况。研究发现,高管薪酬激励越好,上市公司的信息不对称程度和交易成本越小。因子分析结果表明,相对股权激励和持股激励来说,货币薪酬激励对交易成本的影响更大。在国有企业中,股权激励和持股激励并未对交易成本产生影响;在非国有企业中,股权激励、持股激励和货币薪酬激励都减少了公司交易成本。地方中介机构越发达,高管薪酬激励对交易成本的影响越小,说明地方中介机构在信息供给方面具有替代性作用。 The popularity of stock option in China makes managers compensation incentive a hot topic, but few literature studies the relationship between managers' compensation incentive and stock trading costs. Based on high frequency data and factor analysis method, this paper constructs an analytic framework to assess the impact of managers' compensation incentive on stock trading costs. The results show that the stock trading costs are negatively correlated to the intensiveness of managers' compensation incentive and the development of local Intermediary organizations. The factor analysis reveals three compensation factors in China: bonus compensation factor, stock option compensation factor and stock holding compensation factor. Among the three factors, bonus compensation factor makes the most important influence on stock trading costs. While all the three factors are effective in NSOEs, only bonus compensation factor is effective in SOEs.

关 键 词： 薪酬激励 信息不对称 交易成本

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]