作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 青岛大学

出　　处： 《系统工程》 2015年第6期1-9,共9页

摘　　要： 针对由一个生产商和一个提供服务的零售商组成的供应链,分别在生产商Stackelberg(MS)、纵向纳什(VN)、零售商Stackelberg(RS)三种渠道权力结构下,研究了零售商的公平偏好对博弈均衡的影响机制。研究发现:首先,服务水平在RS结构下总是最低。提高服务效率总是有利于生产商利润、系统整体利润或效用,在MS、RS结构下,同样有利于零售商利润或效用。但在VN结构下,若服务效率已经处于较高水平,继续提升反而会损害零售商的利润或效用。其次,当零售商公平偏好时,对其来说渠道权力并不总是越多越好。若其对公平比例要求过高,则作为跟随者才能够获得最高的效用。最后,零售商公平偏好总是有损生产商的利润,且仅在MS下确定有利于自身效用。而在VN和RS下,若零售商对公平比例要求过高,则只会降低自己的效用。研究建议零售商不应同时追求更多的"公平"和更高的"权力"。文章末尾通过数值分析对模型结论进行了验证和说明。 Considering a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one service providing retailer,this paper studies the influence mechanism of the retailer's fair concern on the equilibrium results in three channel scenarios,Manufacturer Stackelberg(MS),Vertical Nash(VN)and Retail Stackelberg(RS).We find several meaningful results.First,the service level is the lowest in RS under any conditions.Improving service efficiency always benefits the profit and utility of the manufacturer and the system as well as the retailer in MS and RS.However,it will damage the profit and utility of the retailer when the service efficiency is very high in VN.Second,when the retailer cares about fairness,it is not neccessarily the case than the more channel power the retailers have,the better it is.If the retailer asks too much about fairness ratio,then he can get the highest utility only in MS.Finally,the fair concern of the retailer always damages the manufacturer's profit,and always benefits himself only in MS.Under VN and RS,the retailer's utility will be cut if he wants too much about fairness ratio.Our research suggests that the retailer should not pursue more'fairness'and more'power'at the same time.At the last,a numerical example is presented to verify and illustrate the above results.

关 键 词： 供应链 公平偏好 服务 渠道权力结构

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