作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 厦门大学经济学院金融系

出　　处： 《预测》 2002年第6期36-40,31,共6页

摘　　要： 一般认为,在资本自由流动的条件下,中央银行外汇干预的传导途径有两条:资产组合途径和信号或预期途径。本文首先简单回顾了穆萨对预期途径的理论分析,然后运用博弈论方法尝试着对预期途径做出不同于穆萨的理论解释,并得到结论:在完全信息条件下,中央银行无法通过预期途径对汇率产生影响;在不完全信息条件下,关注长远利益的中央银行所选择的干预量将小于在完全信息条件下的情况,而且,中央银行可以利用信息优势提高干预的有效性和主动性。 Generally there are two kinds of transmission of exchange intervention under the condition of free capitalmovement. One is the portfoliobalance channel. The other is the signaling channel (or expectation channel). The paper first reviews the theoretical analysis of Mussa's expectation channel. Then, the paper analyzes the expectation channel with game theory differently from that of Mussa. The paper obtains the conclusion: under the condition of complete information, the central bank may not affect exchange rate through expectation channel; under the condition of incomplete information, the central bank, who concerns longrun interest, intervenes less comparing with the condition of complete information, moreover the central bank may intervene actively and improve efficiency by taking advantage of private information.

关 键 词： 外汇干预 预期途径 博弈 完全信息 中央银行

领　　域： [经济管理]