作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 南京农业大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《制度经济学研究》 2009年第2期143-156,共14页

摘　　要： 本文在总结青木昌彦的比较制度分析理论的基础上,概括一个适用于分析制度形成和演变的一般性博弈分析框架,并使用该框架构建一个由土地发展权市场交换域和政治权力域构成的混合域博弈模型,对我国近期的农地非农化收益分配机制的形成和演变进行制度经济学解释。结论指出,农地非农化收益分配机制并不是中央政府单方面制定的法律政策,而是中央政府、地方政府和农民三个博弈主体在现有的管理体制、财政体制及土地产权制度下的博弈产物,由于这些外部环境短期内变化不大,所以目前的制度改革途径难以突破"锁住"效应。建议未来制度改革应该进一步加强对地方政府征地行为约束,提高中央政府和农民对地方政府过度征地行为的监督效率和惩罚力度;引入市场机制,加快农村集体土地产权市场建设。 This paper develops a general game framework for analyzing institutional evolvement in light of the comparative institutional analysis theory by Masahiko Aoki.According to the general framework,it establishes a compound game model including land development right transfer and political power domains to explain the changes in the benefit distribution system of farmland conversion.It concludes that the actual benefit distribution system of land conversion is not simply the law and policies the central government constituted,but the game equilibrium arrived at by the central government,local governments and farmers based on the actual administration system,fiscal system and property right system of rural land.Because of little change in these exterior circumstances in short time,the present reforms of the benefit distribution system have not achieved the expected results.The policy implication indicates that the future reforms have to focus on.further constraining local governmental behaviors of land expropriation and enhancing the monitoring efficiency and disciplinal intension on illegal land expropriation of local governments; and introducing market mechanism and improving property right market of rural land.

关 键 词： 土地收益 分配机制 制度演变 博弈论

领　　域： [经济管理]