作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《制度经济学研究》 2009年第1期136-151,共16页

摘　　要： 通过构建一个游说博弈模型,分析了证券市场上的各种利益集团是如何游说监管者从而影响证券执法水平的。均衡结果显示,监管者有自身的寻租目标,上市公司内部人具有利用公司资源影响监管者的能力,机构投资者不能够获得执法水平的提高给外部投资者带来的全部收益,企业家对未来筹集资本的兴趣降低了,但并未消除既有上市公司内部人攫取控制权私利所造成的扭曲等,都是导致均衡证券执法水平非最优的因素。当监管者分配给自身寻租目标的权重越小,"游说技术"水平越低,股权集中度越高,则控制权私利水平越低,证券执法水平越高,投资者保护水平越高。 This paper has developed a model for analyzing how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of securities law enforcement.Our analysis has identified several factors that may lead the equilibrium level of law enforcement to be sub-optimal.These factors include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence regulators,as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value of efficient law enforcement for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions that arise from insiders'interest in extracting rents from the capital that public firms already have.Decreasing regulators'rent-seeking desire or'lobbying technology'and increasing ownership concentration could bring about lower private benefits of control,higher level of law enforcement and better minority investor protection.

关 键 词： 证券执法 利益集团 游说博弈 中小投资者保护

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]