作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东技术师范学院

出　　处： 《广东技术师范学院学报》 2016年第1期82-88,共7页

摘　　要： 道德情感主义主张道德来源于情感而非理性,其面临最大的难题是如何消除由情感相对性导致的道德相对性。休谟为解决此难题提出同情理论,主张把道德情感归源为人性中广泛存在的同情心;斯密在此基础上强调道德同情心必须是公正旁观者的同情心。同情是情感的共鸣,它能使私人的情感转化为普遍的情感。在此转化过程中,休谟和斯密突出了理性对同情心的引导和修正作用。没有理性引导的同情心仍然是相对的、主观的,只有理性修正过的同情心才能产生普遍客观的道德情感。为此,同情心应该相应地区分为个人同情心和社会同情心,这是同情理论得以解决道德情感相对性难题的关键。 Moral emotionalism advocates that morality comes from passion rather than reason. The biggest problem it is currently facing is how to eliminate the moral relativity caused by relative passion. In order to solve this problem, Hume put forward sympathy theory which advocates that moral sentiments originate from widespread sympathy. Smith emphasized that moral sympathy resonance which can transform a private emotion comes from impartial onlookers. Sympathy is an emotional into a universal one. Both Hume and Smith emphasized that reason must guide and correct sympathy in the process of this transformation. Sympathy without rational guidance is still relative and subjective. Only when it has been corrected by reason can it produce widespread and objective moral emotion. Therefore, sympathy should be divided into personal sympathy and social sympathy. That is the key to addressing the relative problem of moral emotion.

关 键 词： 休谟 亚当 斯密 个人同情心 社会同情心 理性

领　　域： [哲学宗教]