作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 广东机电职业技术学院

出　　处： 《科学技术哲学研究》 2015年第1期21-24,共4页

摘　　要： 生活中除了各种个体行动以外,还存在着大量的集体行动,并不能还原为个体行动的加和。如何解释集体行动呢?约翰·塞尔的分析是比较独到而清晰的:通过对个体行动的意向因果性分析,说明意向就是行动的原因;集体拥有集体意向,因而能够实行集体行动;集体意向的不可还原性和实在性保证了集体的实在性。笔者赞成塞尔的主要观点,但不赞成他关于"在先意向"和"行动中意向"的区分,指出意向与行动之间的因果关系决定了所有的意向都是在先的,只是程度有所不同。"行动中意向"这一概念将对集体意向和集体行动的整体性和不可还原性起到破坏作用。 Beyond various individual actions there are some kinds of actions which can＇t be reduced to the accumulation of individual actions. How do we explain these collective actions？ John. R. Searle had given a distinct analysis. As the intentional causation in individual action,the collective intention can lead to collective action. The irreducibility and reality of the collective intention guarantee the reality of the collectivity. We agree with Searle＇s main viewpoints,but don＇t agree with his differentiation between the apriori integrity and the- intention- in- action.The causal relation between intention and action makes all the intentions prior to actions. The term the- intention-in- action will destroy the integrity and irreducibility of the collective intention and action.

关 键 词： 行动 集体行动 意向因果性 集体意向性

领　　域： [自然科学总论]