作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中央财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《审计研究》 2014年第4期63-71,共9页

摘　　要： 以往关于会计监管效果的文献主要关注监管者对财务错报的事后处罚。利用中国注册会计师协会自2011年启动的年报审计风险约谈制度,本文首次考察了预防性监管的效果。在约谈制度中,行业组织约谈会计师事务所审计人员,就其特定上市客户的较高审计风险进行提示。基于2011至2013年间的历次约谈信息,我们发现,与控制样本相比,在约谈中被作为风险提示对象的上市公司最终公布的年度业绩显著低于管理层在年报公布前作出的当期盈利预测,这意味着被约谈审计师对受到风险提示的客户实施了更加稳健的审计。另一方面,尽管中注协的约谈公告就普遍性的上市公司风险特征作出了提示,我们没有发现被约谈事务所对约谈涉及公司之外的、但具有类似风险特征的其他上市客户作出更谨慎对待,这意味着约谈制度尚未表现出明显的"溢出效应"。 Prior literature on accounting regulation mainly focuses on ex post sanctions. We examine the effect of preventive regulation based the CICPA＇ s ＂Risky Engagement Interview＂ program launched since 2011. In this program,the CICPA summons audit partners whose listed clients very likely have higher audit risk. Based on the program＇ s internal record during 2011-2013 ,we find that for listed companies that are directly targeted in an interview, their finalized earnings tend to be significantly lower than the earnings forecasts made by management, which suggests that interviewed auditors responded to the interview by conducting a stricter audit. On the other hand, we do not find evidence that interviewed auditors conducted stricter audits to their listed clients who are not directly targeted by the CICPA but have similar audit risk profile, which suggests that the CICPA＇ s interview program has not exhibited a significant ＂spillover effect＂.

关 键 词： 预防性监管 审计风险 中注协约谈 盈利预测

领　　域： [经济管理]