作　　者： ; ; (张辛夷）;

机构地区： 青岛大学

出　　处： 《商业经济》 2014年第9期31-34,共4页

摘　　要： 针对由两个零售商和一个共同的供应商组成的供应链,供应商将具有可替代性的两种产品通过两个零售商进行销售,零售商为其产品提供服务,供应商为零售商提供服务补贴。分析得出:向零售商提供服务补贴虽然能够提高零售商针对自己产品所提供的服务水平,增加其产品的市场占有率和供应商的利润,但并不能增加零售商的利润,反而会使其利润减少。如果在供应商向零售商提供服务补贴的供应链中采用纳什讨价还价机制,不仅可以使产品的服务和销量保持在不采用纳什讨价还价机制的供应商向零售商提供服务补贴时供应链的水平,还可以使供应商和零售商的利润都增加,此时供应商愿意提供服务补贴,零售商愿意接受服务补贴。 Analyzing the supply chain composed by two retailers and a common supplier, the supplier let two retailers sell replaceable products;the retailers provide services for their products and supplier provide service subsidies for retailers. The conclusion is although subsidies could improve the level of service and increase market share and profits of supplier, it will decrease the profits of retailers. The Nash bargaining mechanism could not only maintain the level, but also both increase the profits of supplier and retailers. Then the supplier is willing to provide service subsidies, and the retailers are willing to accept service subsidies.

关 键 词： 服务补贴 供应商 供应链 博弈研究

领　　域： [经济管理]