作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学数学科学学院

出　　处： 《顺德职业技术学院学报》 2014年第1期38-41,52,共5页

摘　　要： 打击假货,是政府维护社会经济秩序的责任,也是企业维护自身利益的行为。然而,打假应投入多少才合理、何时应改变打假的力度、怎么样的打假策略最佳等等问题直接关系到政府与企业的工作效益与经济收益。本文通过建立微分方程模型,以及通过打假者-制造者之间的博弈,找出达到纳什均衡的条件等等的方式,从而得出假货产生与增长的规律,同时为打假提出若干意见。 To crack down on counterfeits is the responsibility of the government to maintain social and economic order, and it also benefits the enterprise to maintain its own interests. However, anti-counterfeiting has the problems of cost control, intensity alternation and strategy employment, all of which are directly related to the work efficiency and eco-nomic benefits of the government and the enterprise. By establishing the differential equation model, and the game be-tween the entities who crack down and produce counterfeits, this paper finds out the conditions of reaching the Nash equilibrium, and draws up the law of the appearance and growth of fake goods. Meanwhile, it gives some advises on the basis of the findings.

关 键 词： 假冒伪劣 微分方程 纳什均衡 打假策略

领　　域： [理学] [理学] [理学] [理学]