作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学人文科学学院逻辑与认知研究所

出　　处： 《自然辩证法研究》 2014年第5期14-19,共6页

摘　　要： 按照弗雷格的精确性要求,含混表达式没有指称,由此导致包含含混表达式的语句没有真值。弗雷格的这种观点在当代语境中通常被解读为关于含混性的一种虚无主义立场。然而,这种解读没有注意到弗雷格对精确性要求所附加的限定条件,也即从逻辑的观点看。这就意味着存在另外的非逻辑观点,从这种观点看,日常语言的含混语词或表达式有指称并且含混语句也有真值。 According to Frege＇s sharpness requirement, vague expressions have no reference and the sentences which contain vague expressions have no truth-value. Frege＇s view on vagueness is traditionally read as holding a nihilist approach to vagueness in contemporary context. However, this reading ignores the qualification on sharpness requirement given by Frege, i.e, from a logical point of view. It means that there may be a non-logical point of view, according to which vague words or expressions in ordinary language have reference and vague sentences have truth-value.

关 键 词： 弗雷格 含混性 堆垛悖论 精确性要求 日常语言

领　　域： [自然科学总论]