作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《南方经济》 2014年第4期80-93,共14页

摘　　要： 传统的学术观点认为完善的法律制度是抑制股市过度投机的主要手段。然而,法律制度不断完善的中国股票市场为什么仍然存在普遍的过度投机行为呢?本文利用2012年3月29日"两高"颁布的《内幕交易司法解释》这一事件,采用事件分析法实证考察司法干预是引发股市过度投机行为的重要原因。研究发现在《解释》颁布日前后几个交易日内,存在内幕交易或者内幕交易嫌疑的全样本公司的股票收益率反应均显著为负,而且全样本中国有控股公司组比非国有控股公司组在《解释》颁布日前后的股票收益率变化程度更弱。这说明尽管投资者预期《解释》能够有助于处罚内幕交易相关诉讼法律的实施,但是实施程度受到司法干预的限制,表现在国有企业享受的地方政府的"父爱主义"已经延伸至司法领域。 The conventional opinion maintains that improving the institutions become the main approach of restraining the speculation of the stock market. However, why the widespread speculation happens in the Chinese stock market with better institutions？ The paper utilizes the event of Chinese high court and procuratorate issuing 《judicial interpretation of insider trading》, and empirically inspects that the judicial intervention is the significant reason leading to the speculation of the stock market. During the period of issuing the judicial interpretation, the research shows the rate of the stock return on the samples is significantly negative, furthermore, the samples controlled by local government have less negative stock price response, comparing with the others. The results indicate that although the investors predict the judicial interpretation is beneficial for the enforcement of relative laws punishing insider trading, yet the degree of law enforcement is limited by judicial intervention, conducting that the local government has extended ＂the paternalism＂ for state - owned companies into judicial practices.

关 键 词： 司法干预 超额收益率 司法解释

领　　域： [经济管理]