作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》 2014年第2期125-128,共4页

摘　　要： 科学理论的结构问题是科学哲学的重要问题,基于公认观点的理论还原观与基于库恩范式理论的突现观展示了截然不同的科学进步的途径。对比两种观点可知,单纯的还原观和单纯的突现观都不能客观地看待科学的发展,从静态分析科学理论的结构,科学理论并非完全可还原,而是部分可还原;从动态(社会历史角度)分析科学理论的演变,科学理论具有突现的特征,但范式间并非完全不可通约而是部分可通约。范式的部分可通约可借助公认观点的对应规则得到解释。 The structure of scientific theories is an important issue in the philosophy of science, in which theoretic reductionism based on received views and emergentism based on Kuhn＇s paradigm theory take distinct paths of scientific progress. By comparing the two views, this paper points out that neither mere reductionism nor mere emergentism can give an objective description of scientific development. A static analysis of the structure of scientific theories is not completely but partly reducible and a dynamic analysis of the revolution of scientific theories from the perspective of social history does take on an emergent characteristics; however, it is not completely but partly incommensurable between paradigms. It is suggested that the partly commensurability of paradigms can be explained by the corresponding rules of received views.

关 键 词： 科学理论 范式 公认观点 不可通约性 还原 突现

领　　域： [自然科学总论]