作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心

出　　处： 《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》 2013年第5期71-82,共12页

摘　　要： 依据中国银行业的发展背景,本文建立了混合寡占市场结构下的限制性定价(limit pricing)进入-遏阻模型。其中具有社会福利和利润混合目标的国有银行充当Stackelberg领导者,外资银行为跟随者,国内私营银行为潜在进入者。研究发现:在完全信息条件下,对大多数假设下的存款竞争而言,无论从总效用和自身利润出发,国有银行都会选择容纳私营银行的策略。但在存款竞争的某些参数假设下,国有银行的双重目标之间存在矛盾:从总效用的角度来看,国有银行会选择容纳私营银行的策略;但从自身利润的角度来看,国有银行会选择限制性定价来遏阻私营银行的策略,即限制性定价可以成为博弈的SPNE解。另外,在某些参数假设下,存在外资银行搭便车的现象,且遏阻的结果会最终会带来社会福利损失。 Based on the background of the banking industry in China, this paper establishes limit pricing entry deterrence models with deposit as the strategic variable. A state-owned bank acts as the Stackelberg leader and a foreign bank acts as the follower, while a domestic private bank is the potential entrant. It is found that at the scenario of complete information, for most assumptions of deposit competition, the state-owned bank will choose to accommodate the private entrant no matter from the standpoint of its own profit or total utility. However, under some special assumptions, there are conflicts between double objectives of the state-owned bank： from the total utility standpoint, the state-owned will choose to accommodate the private counterpart; but from the standpoint of its own profit, it will use limit pricing to deter the private bank. i.e limit pricing could become the SPNE of the game. Moreover, it shows that the foreign bank free rides at some circumstances, which will bring out loss to the social welfare per se.

关 键 词： 限制性定价 混合寡占 银行业竞争

领　　域： [经济管理]