作　　者： ;

机构地区： 河南工业大学经济贸易学院

出　　处： 《无锡商业职业技术学院学报》 2013年第5期10-13,共4页

摘　　要： 文章从新制度经济学角度的不完全合约框架下探讨多任务委托代理合约的选择,试图证明当代理人行为不可观察时,合适的激励安排能降低由信息不对称导致的委托人福利损失。重复的带有考核期的分类合约和终身雇佣制比一次签订、长久执行的合约更能节约委托人的信息租金,具有明显效率优势。当任务的价值、成功率、成本投入与周期差距明显时,终身雇佣制是合适的选择,但要求委托人有较高的声誉保证。当委托人难以有效辨别代理人类型时,有考核期的分类合约则是合意的选择。 This paper, from the perspective of new institutional economics, discusses the selection of multitask- ing principal-agent contract under the frame of incomplete contract theory. It proves the following four points： 1.appropriate incentive arrangement can reduce the principal＇s welfare loss because of asymmetric information when the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is always acting in the principal＇s best interests; 2. repetition of classified contracts, in which performance measurement period is defined, and life time employ- ment system can save more information rent for the principal than single contracts; 3.when a big gap exists be- tween the task＇s value, success possibility, investment cost and the task cycle, the lifetime employment system is the right choice, but the principal should have a high reputation; 4.when the principal can＇t identify effec- tively the agent as is expected, the repetition of classified contracts with performance evaluation period defined is the right choice.

关 键 词： 不完全合约 委托代理 激励安排 新制度经济学

领　　域： [经济管理]