作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 南京大学地理与海洋科学学院城市与区域规划系

出　　处： 《城市规划》 2013年第9期46-50,共5页

摘　　要： 从博弈论的角度出发,审视现状传统民居型历史地段中的利益博弈关系,细究博弈各方自我逐利心理膨胀的原因,指出博弈过程中有约束力契约的缺失是导致现状非合作博弈的关键所在。以地段产权现状为基础,构建合理产权体系则可严格约束各方博弈主体行为,起到博弈契约的功能,最终推动地段博弈从非合作向合作目标转变。 From the perspective of the game theory, this paper analyzes the relationship between the different parties in the current traditional residential-type historic districts, explores the causes for profit-oriented mode and points out that the lack of restraint contract is the key factor that leads to the current uncooperative game. A reasonable property right system constructed on the basis of current property rights of the districts can act as a game contract and strictly restrain the behavior of all the parties in the game, which can ultimately promote the shift from non-cooperation to cooperation between the different parties of the historic districts.

关 键 词： 传统民居型历史地段 保护更新 博弈

领　　域： [建筑科学]