作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《金融学季刊》 2013年第1期120-136,共17页

摘　　要： 诉讼是一种高成本解决利益冲突的方式，一般是在双方关系僵持到破裂甚至公开对立时才使用。当银行对不能及时归还借款本息的企业提起诉讼时，一方面破坏了银企关系，作为一种惩罚也破坏了声誉的隐性契约作用，其“社会实施”机制导致企业原有的声誉资产丧失，导致企业信贷融资规模大幅下降，与同行业的其他企业相比也有显著差异。对不同所有权性质企业的检验结果表明，国有企业借款可得性受到的影响要比非国有企业小，政府的“援助之手”为国有企业提供隐形担保，信贷歧视现象依然存在。尽管被诉讼的公司发生了显著的CEO变更，但这种变更对其融资的影响并不明显。 This paper focused on the lawsuits between firms and bank because of debt due and drew the conclusions： as a high-cost solution to conflict, lawsuits mean both termination of firm-bank relationship and loss of reputation. Lack of relationship and community enforcement of reputation leads to decline in bank loan financing. In contrast with the control samples, the differ- ence behaved significantly. In addition, when grouped by ownership, the results revealed that bank loan financing of state-owned enterprises is more available than non-state enterprises. The helping hand of government guarantees for state-owned enterprises and there remains credit discrimination. The helping hand of government guarantees for state-owned enterprises and there remains credit discrimination. Despite being lawsuit of company CEO changes significantly, hut the effect of the changes to the financing is not obvious.

关 键 词： 诉讼 声誉 银企关系 信贷融资

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]