作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东金融学院会计系

出　　处： 《证券市场导报》 2013年第9期27-32,46,共7页

摘　　要： IPO超募为创业板企业研发投入提供了充裕的资金保障,但这是否意味着管理层愿意增加企业研发投入呢?本文实证考察了IPO超募资金与创业企业R&D投入之间的作用机制。研究发现,管理层对超募资金的预期影响了企业的R&D投入强度。当企业超募超过预期规模,属严重超募时,随着企业冗余资源的增加,"冗余式"研发投入强度会增强;当企业超募低于预期规模,属非严重超募时,随着企业实际超募程度的加剧,企业"问题式"研发投入意愿会减弱,超募严重程度与R&D投入之间存在着U型关系。进一步研究还发现,政府补贴力度强化了超募程度与企业R&D投入之间的敏感度。本文的结论表明,应合理引导管理层对超募的预期,这也为理解转轨制度背景下的创业板企业R&D投入作用机制提供了一个新视角。 IPO super offering provides a sufficient capital guarantee for enterprise＇s R＆D input. However, does management be willing to increase R＆D input？ This paper empirically investigates the mechanism between IPO super offering and R＆D input. The results show that the management＇s expectation of IPO super offering impacts the extent of R＆D input. The enterprise increases the slack R＆D input when its IPO super offering exceeds the expected scale, and decreases problemistic R＆D input when its IPO super offering is less than the expected scale. There is a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between IPO super offering extent and enterprise＇s R＆D input. Further research indicates that the level of government subsidies intensifies the sensitivity between IPO super offering extent and R＆D input. Thus, this paper provides a new perspective for understanding the mechanism of ChiNext board enterprises＇ R＆D inputs in China＇s transition economy.

关 键 词： 超募资金 冗余式研发 问题式研发 政府补贴

领　　域： [经济管理]