作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处： 《会计与经济研究》 2013年第3期3-17,共15页

摘　　要： 通过总经理薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性来考察薪酬委员会特征(独立性、规模以及成员平均报酬)对于我国上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,研究结果表明,薪酬委员会特征确实对上市公司高管薪酬契约的有效性产生影响,但是这种影响在国有和民营上市公司之间存在差异。对于国有公司而言,薪酬委员会中独立董事的比例越高,尤其当薪酬委员会成员全部为独立董事时,以及薪酬委员会规模越大,总经理薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性越强;对于民营公司而言,当总经理担任薪酬委员会成员,或者薪酬委员会中独立董事的比例越低,以及薪酬委员会规模越大,总经理薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性越强;薪酬委员会成员的平均报酬对于这两类公司总经理薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性都没有影响。 This paper examines whether compensation committee characteristics affect the effective- ness of compensation contract in Chinese listed companies, by testing the change of CEO pay-performance sensitivity from compensation committee independence, committee size and average pay of compensation committee members. The empirical result shows that compensation committee characteristics do have effect on the effectiveness of compensation contract, but the effect differs between SOEs and private firms. For SOEs, the more independent directors in compensation committee, especially when consisting solely of in- dependent directors, and the larger the compensation committee size, the stronger CEO pay-performance sensitivity is. For private firms, when CEO serving on compensation committee, the less independent di- rectors in compensation committee, and the larger the compensation committee size, the stronger CEO pay - performance sensitivity is. There is no evidence to support that average pay of compensation committee members has effect on CEO pay - performance sensitivity of both SOEs and private firms.

关 键 词： 薪酬委员会 独立性 薪酬 业绩敏感性

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]