作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学政治与行政学院

出　　处： 《中国行政管理》 2013年第8期58-61,共4页

摘　　要： 通过绩效目标的达成情况来控制基层公务员的行为是一种新型的问责模式,与新公共管理"结果导向"的管理理念具有内在契合之处。但达成绩效目标所要求的基层公务员能够根据具体情境自由裁量的权力,同样蕴含着潜在的风险,在问责过程中带来"可计量任务‘驱逐’不可计量任务"、"选择性执行"以及"绩效悖论"等困境。此外,环境的复杂性、"运动式治理"方式以及冲突性的问责要求等不可控因素,使基层公务员的绩效问责充满不确定性。因此,有必要对"绩效"与"问责"的假设关系进行更深入的反思。 Performance--based accountability is a new accountability model which is derived from ＂result--oriented＂ ideas of NPM. There are some predicament such as ＂ measurable tasks drive out immeasurable task＂, ＂selective en-forcement＂ and performance paradox during the process of performance--based accountability due to the environmental uncertainty and substantial discretion. Furthermore, the outcome of performance--based accountability is deeply affected by a lot of uncertain factors, eg. the complexity of governance environment, ＂mobilized governance＂ model and competing accountability requirements. Thus, it＇s necessary to think deeply about the relationship between ＂performance＂ and ＂accountability＂.

关 键 词： 绩效问责 基层公务员 街头官僚

领　　域： [政治法律] [政治法律]