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公共景区的产权残缺及其经济分析
Incomplete Property Right on Chinese Public Scenic Spots and Related Economic Analysis

作  者: ; ; ; ;

机构地区: 北京联合大学旅游学院

出  处: 《旅游学刊》 2013年第6期87-93,共7页

摘  要: 现代经济学已经认识到产权制度对经济效率和经济行为的影响作用。文章重点关注旅游资源以全民所有和集体所有为依托的景区的产权性质,在分析公共景区的产权基础后,提出目前中国公共景区的产权残缺,并进一步讨论这种产权残缺下的经济效率和经济影响。主要研究结论为:公共景区收益权和控制权的集中带来了经济效率的提升,但由于地方政府并非公共景区的实际所有者,因此在追求公共景区租值最大化的同时,可以不考虑全民和集体"委托人"的利益,有着为短期利益可以放弃长期收益的激励,这可以进一步解释公共景区开发过程中的各种现象。在此基础上,文章对未来的研究进行了展望。 This research focuses on the property right of scenic spots which are owned by "all-people" or by the collective, namely "public scenic spots". In China, world heritage sites, national parks, geological parks, cultural relics and resorts all belong to this category. In the operation of these scenic spots, two opposite views have been proposed which are the "National Park" approach and the "property-right transfer" approach. Some people argue that public scenic spots in China should be operated by the "National Park" approach, while others believe that a private company should he contracted to lead the management and operation of these sites. It seems obvious that the debate is still going on since the property rights of such scenic spots have already been claimed unambiguously a long time ago. This research finds that the property right which is soundly declared to belong to "all people" in fact is ambiguous. In some cases, it may be said to be "owner-free". In order to further explain the behavior of the operators of scenic spots, it is necessary to analyze the actual property right status of the public scenic spots. Property rights play a crucial role in an economy. Many studies have been done by Coase (1937,1960) , Alchian ( 1965,1993), Demsetz ( 1967 ), Barzel ( 1989 ), and Cheung ( 1969,1970,1974 ). All Private owners have strong incentives to use their property right in the most valuable way. Based on private property right, the two sides in a transaction can choose a contract to avoid risk, reduce costs and improve efficiency. In fact, the rent of a resource will dissipate without private property right. Private property right is a comprehensive structure that contains a variety of right elements. If a portion in a bundle of property rights is prohibited, the rent will certainly dissipate to some degree, which is named the first type of incomplete property rights. When an owner voluntarily yields his part or all of the control powers in exchange for benefits

关 键 词: 公共景区 产权残缺 经济效率 经济行为

领  域: [经济管理] [经济管理]

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