作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 石河子大学经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《经济与管理研究》 2013年第5期5-17,共13页

摘　　要： 内容提本文针对2006～2010年中国上市公司数据对管理者权力、内部薪酬差距与公司价值之间的关系进行了研究。结果表明:中国上市公司内部的管理者与员工薪酬差距与公司价值正相关,内部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应,支持锦标赛理论,但是管理者权力的存在抑制了内部薪酬差距激励效应的发挥。结合股权性质的研究发现,国有股权性质不仅抑制了内部薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应,并且强化了管理者权力对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应的抑制作用。此外,对管理者权力与内部薪酬差距影响公司价值的内在机理进行研究,结果发现,内部薪酬差距能够提高管理者的薪酬一业绩敏感性,但管理者权力抑制了内部薪酬差距对薪酬一业绩敏感性的提高。本文的结果表明薪酬差距激励效应的发挥需要其他公司治理机制的配合,合理配置公司控制权,对管理者权力设置相应约束机制,薪酬差距的激励效应才能得到更好的体现。 Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2010 as samples ,this paper empirically examines relationship among managerial power, internal compensation dispersion and firm value. The results show that：the internal compensation dispersion between managers and staff is positive with firm value. The compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect, which supports the tournament theory, but the managerial power will curb the incentive effect of compensation dispersion. The paper makes a further research about the managerial power,internal compensation and firm value based on different ownership property , and finds that the state - owned nature not only curbs the incentive effect of internal compensation dispersion, but also strengthens the inhibitory effect of managerial power to the incentive effect of internal compensation dispersion. Besides, The paper studies about the influence mechanism behind the relationships studied, and finds that the higher internal compensation dispersion can raise the pay - performance sensitivity, but the managerial power will curb this effect. The results indicate that the incentive effect of compensation dispersion needs other company governance mechanism＇s coordination. By allocating the control of a company rationally, setting up corresponding power restriction mechanisms, companies can better realize the incentive effect of compensation dispersion

关 键 词： 管理者权力 薪酬差距 公司价值

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]