作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学计算机学院

出　　处： 《小型微型计算机系统》 2013年第5期987-992,共6页

摘　　要： 为解决具有非服从性节点的系统中存储资源提供的真实性与公平性问题,结合委托-代理理论,提出一种兼顾真实与公平的存储资源提供机制.机制中,资源节点和用户节点同时承担委托人和代理人两类角色,一方面由用户节点的历史贡献量、资源需求量及需求紧迫性形成基于多私有信息的特定支付和效用函数,支付函数同时是一种资源提供方式,保证越高单位历史贡献量的用户节点越多的获得资源;另一方面以资源节点的综合性能和资源实际提供量作为私有信息形成支付和效用函数,使用户可依据单位资源的综合性能进行选择.理论分析证明效用函数及支付函数的设计对用户节点和资源节点激励相容,模拟实验也证明该资源提供机制既达到了贡献的越多获得的越多的公平效果,又保证了节点在其私有信息提供时的真实性. To solve true and fair issues in non-obedient storage resource providing, a storage providing mechanism combined true and fair is introduced using principal-agent theory. In the mechanism, resource nodes and user nodes both play a role of principal and agent. On the one hand, multi-private information with history contribution, resource demand and demand urgency forms a certain payment function and utility function. The payment function is also a resource providing method to guarantee user with higher unit-sized history con- tribution to get more resource. On the other hand, multi-private information with resource node whole performance and actual providing amount forms a payment function and utility function, which enables user to select unit-sized resource by integrated performance. Theo- ry analysis show that those payment and utility functions make resource and user incentive compatible. Simulations also show that such mechanism has the effect of fair and can stimulate nodes to tell the truth when providing private information.

关 键 词： 非服从性存储资源 真实与公平 委托 代理理论 激励相容 支付函数 效用函数

领　　域： [自动化与计算机技术] [自动化与计算机技术]