机构地区: 南开大学
出 处: 《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》 2013年第3期6-8,14,共4页
摘 要: 合理的投票系统都是操纵的,决策形成过程中的防策略投票问题属于社会选择应用领域的前沿问题。分别从模态逻辑、一阶逻辑、命题逻辑的角度,研究了防操纵社会选择机制的核心理论——防策略不可能性定理。希望由此引发对这一领域感兴趣的学者做进一步的探究。 Reasonable voting systems are all manipulated.Strategy-proofness voting problem in decision making process,belongs to the cutting-edge issue in the field of social choice application.From the modal logic,first order logic and propositional logic point of view,the article researches the core theory of strategy-proofness social choice mechanism——Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.The author hopes to cause scholars of this field in our country are interested in further knowledge and study.
关 键 词: 防策略 社会选择 模态逻辑 一阶逻辑 命题逻辑
领 域: [哲学宗教]