作　　者： ; ; ; ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处： 《系统科学与数学》 2013年第2期127-140,139-140+138,共14页

摘　　要： 研究制造商主导下带有风险约束的混合渠道供应链协调问题,其中,市场需求是随机的.考虑企业决策者均为风险厌恶型,运用均值方差(Mean-variance)风险度量准则将风险约束引入混合渠道供应链模型.在Stackelberg博弈框架下,利用收益共享契约来协调混合渠道供应链.研究表明,收益共享契约可以有效协调风险约束下的混合渠道供应链.讨论利润分享系数、价格差转移系数、市场份额系数对协调可能性及效果的影响,并利用数值算例分析验证了结论的正确性. This paper considers the constraints of risk to research mixed marketing channel coordination issues under conditions of stochastic market demand, asymmetric information and the leading manufacturer. Assume the decision makers are risk averse, the meanariance risk measurement criterion is used to lead risk constraints into mixed channel decision model. We use revenue-sharing contract under Stackelberg framework to coordinate mixed-channel supply chain, and determine valid range of the contract parameter. We also discuss the effect of profit-sharing coefficient, price transfer coefficient, and market share coefficient on the possibility and effectiveness of coordination. Finally, several numerical examples are given to show the effectiveness of the obtained conclusion.

关 键 词： 风险厌恶 混合渠道 供应链 收益共享

领　　域： [自动化与计算机技术] [自动化与计算机技术]