作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 浙江大学经济学院

出　　处： 《南方经济》 2013年第2期1-11,84,共12页

摘　　要： 明清时期,中国基层社会逐渐形成了以地方乡绅为领袖、以宗族和乡族组织为基础的社会自治;在当代,中国政府通过推行村民自治和社会管理体制改革,正在重建基层社会自治制度。为什么拥有专断权力的政府需要基层社会在一定程度上实行自治?对此问题,学术界有两种观点:一为"官治能力受限论",一为"集权的政治风险论"。我们通过把传统中国与当代中国连贯起来考察,发现"官治能力受限论"有很大局限,它与当代中国重建基层社会自治制度相矛盾,而"集权的政治风险论"则具有更一般化的解释能力。而且,"集权的政治风险论"可以扩展为一般化理论,用于解释中国纵向分权的治理结构及其演变趋势。 During the Ming and Qing dynasties, China＇ s grass- roots society gradually formed the social autonomy in which the local squires were leaders and the organizations of patriarchal clan were the foundation. In modem times, the Chinese government is rebuilding the system of grass - roots social autonomy through the implementation the autonomy of villagers and reform of social management system. Why do the government with the arbitrary power need the grass- roots social autonomy to a certain extent？ This problem, in academic, there are two views： one is the theory of officials with constrained administrative capacity, the other one is the theory of political risk of Centralization. With combining traditional China and contemporary China to research, we find there is an enormous of limitation of theory of officials with constrained administrative capacity. And it contradicts with the reconstruction of grass - roots social autonomy in contemporary China. However, it has more general explanation ability in the theory of political risk of Centralization. In addition, the theory which comes from the generalization of theory of political risk of Centralization can explain the Chinese vertical decentralized governance structure and its evolution trend.

关 键 词： 政治风险 纵向分权 社会自治

领　　域： [经济管理] [社会学]