作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《会计研究》 2013年第1期28-34,95,共7页

摘　　要： 本文以2001-2010年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,从稳健性的角度,探讨了贷款方式和企业性质对银行监管的影响。实证结果显示:(1)担保借款对稳健性的需求明显高于信用借款。(2)银行在事后风险控制过程中,信贷歧视现象仍然存在,具体表现为:在国有企业里,信用借款比例越高,企业稳健性越低;在非国有企业里,二者显著正相关。进一步地,结合货币政策的变动,研究发现该歧视行为主要体现在货币政策紧缩的年份。 We examine the association between bank loans and accounting conservatism in two different firms(state-owned and non-state-owned) respectively, in order to test whether the phenomenon of bank discrimination still exists after bank lending. Our initial sample consists of all firms with positive bank loan, which listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the years 2001 to 2010. Empirical results show that the bank continue to discriminate NSOEs in the process of controlling default risk after lending. Specifically, the bank demand less conservatism for SOEs than NSOEs when they provided credit loans. Further, we find this phenomenon mainly reflected in the years when the central bank tightens the monetary policies.

关 键 词： 会计稳健性 货币政策 信贷歧视

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]