作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 深圳大学经济学院

出　　处： 《特区经济》 2013年第1期72-73,共2页

摘　　要： 众所周知,现代银行作为一个企业,具有与一般意义上的企业同样的因经营不善或其它原因而导致的破产倒闭的可能性,尤其是在金融危机频发的当代。那么,当银行破产倒闭时,储户或者说存款人的存款由谁来负责赔偿就成为一个问题。如果这个问题解决不好,极有可能引发社会的不稳定。基于上述考虑,存款保险制度应运而生,在一定程度上,存款保险制度不仅保护了存款人的利益,而且维护了金融体系乃至整个社会的稳定。但任何制度在实际运行中都无一例外地表现出两重性。存款保险制度也不例外。从实际运行情况来看,其存在着很大的缺陷,其中尤以各方的道德风险行为最为突出。基于此,本文着眼于存款保险制度下的道德风险问题,主要分三部分,第一部分是一个简单的引言;第二部分分别从存款人和投保银行的角度对其进行分析;第三部分在分析的基础上,提出防范道德风险的几个措施,以供参考;最后,对全文进行简要总结。 As we all know,as a business company,modern banking also have the possibility of bankruptcy due to poor management or other reasons,just like the general enterprises,especially in the contemporary with frequent financial crisis.So,when the bank failures, who is responsible for compensation to depositors of deposits becomes a problem.If this issue is not well resolved,it is most likely to trigger social instability. Based on these considerations above-mentioned, the deposit insurance system came into being,to a certain extent,the deposit insurance system not only protects the interests of depositors,but also maintains the stability of the financial system and the whole community.But any system,without exception,manifested duality in actual operation.Deposit insurance system is also no exception.Form a practical operation point of view,there is a lot of shortcomings,among of these defects,moral hazard behavior of all parties is the most prominent.Based on this,the paper focuses on the moral hazard problem under the deposit insurance system,mainly of three parts,in the first part I conducted a simple introduction;in the second part I analyze this problem from the perspective of depositors and the insured banks respectively;in the third part I put forward several measures to prevent moral hazard for reference on the basis of the analysis.Finally,a brief summary of the full text is given.

关 键 词： 存款保险制度 道德风

领　　域： [经济管理]