机构地区: 石河子大学经济与管理学院
出 处: 《软科学》 2012年第10期107-112,共6页
摘 要: 以2004~2009年中国上市公司为样本,从管理者权力角度考察管理层激励对过度投资的治理效应。结果表明,货币薪酬激励和股权激励对上市公司的过度投资行为具有抑制作用,但是管理者权力和国有性质均弱化了管理层激励的这种治理效应,在国有上市公司中,管理者权力对管理层激励效应的抑制作用更强。 This paper exams how management incentives influence over - investment from the perspective of managerial pow- er by the data from 2004 to 2009 of Chinese listed companies as samples. Result shows that both monetary and stock incen- tives can attenuate over - investment, but the managerial power and state - owned shareholder will weaken this effect, and in state -owned companies, the managerial power has stronger inhibiting effect to management incentive.