作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《管理世界》 2012年第7期29-43,187,共15页

摘　　要： 本文尝试从政府职能在中国转轨经济过程中的激励与约束视角入手，从政府干预的角度，回答政府与银行不良贷款形成之间的关系。本文通过研究国内某国有商业银行1988～2005年的全部剥离不良资产数据为初始样本发现，政府干预是银行不良贷款产生的主要原因。政治晋升锦标赛的激励、地方分权和财政分成制的改革构成了政府干预的动机和能力，这种干预由于企业产权和地区市场化程度的不同而在不良贷款形成中有所差异，具体来说国有企业比非国有企业有着更高的不良贷款、贷款期限更长和更低的担保系数；企业所在地区市场化程度越高，不良贷款更少、贷款期限更短和担保系数更高，而地区法制环境好坏在其中起着最为重要的作用，而且国有企业性质的存在会削弱地区法制管制对不良贷款产生的抑制效果。 In this paper,we have attempted to start from the aspect of the stimulation and constraint of the government function in process of China ’ s economic transition and from the angle of the government intervention(GI) to explain the relationship between the government and the non-performing loans given by the bank(NPLGBTB).By the re search on the initial sample the data of defective assets given up totally by a certain commercial bank of China from 1988 to 2005,we have discovered that the GI is the main cause for the occurrence of the NPLGBTB.The stim ulation of the political promotion contest,the decentralization and the reform of the fiscal sharing system are the mo tive and ability of the GI,and this intervention has varied with the difference of firm ’ s property right and with the degree of the regional commercialization,concretely,the state-owned firms have still more non-performing loans than non-state-owned firms,have still longer terms of loan and still low level of assurance.The greater the degree of commercialization in the district where the enterprise is located,the less the NPLGBTB,the still shorter the time limit of the loan and the still higher level of assurance.However,the quality of the regional legal environment plays the most important role therein,and the existence of the nature of state-owned enterprises will weaken the constrain ing effect of the regional legal control on happening of non-performing loans.

关 键 词： 政府干预 不良贷款 产权制度 市场化

领　　域： [经济管理]