作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学

出　　处： 《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》 2012年第2期70-79,157-158,共10页

摘　　要： "专用性"是新制度经济学,尤其是交易费用经济学的核心概念,但如何对其内生化却悬而未决。与已有的物质论不同,从制度角度对专用性进行系统的解释,发现专用性水平是专用性租金分配的单调递增的反应函数。从单边角度来看,专用性投资者对交易对手敲竹杠行为的弱反应会减少效率损失;从双边角度来看,强反应会减少效率损失。在一定条件下契约安排能够提高有效的专用性水平,最优契约设计的契约替代率必须与特定控制和剩余控制的边际费用比率相等,否则可以调整契约结构以节约交易费用。制度环境通过影响边际交易费用产生替代效应与专用性效应,替代效应加剧了契约多样性,专用性效应解释了相同的交易在不同制度环境中可能存在不同的专用性水平。 The'specificity'is a core concept in the field of New Institution Economics,especially Transaction Cost Economics,but it has not been endogenously explained. Different from the material view of specificity,this research,based on institutional perspective,finds that the level of specificity is the increasable function of the distribution of appropriable specialized quasi-rents; the weak response of specific investor to hold-up man could decrease efficiency losses based on unilateral perspective; in contradiction,strong response could decrease efficiency losses based on bilateral perspective. In particular condition,contract arrangement can improve effective level of specificity. The CRS( contact rate of substitution) must be equal to ratio of marginal transactional cost between specific control and residual control in option contract design,or the transaction costs could be economized by adjusting contractual structure. The institutional environments influence marginal transactional cost to produce substitution effects that aggravate the diversity of contract. Specificity-effect can explain why there are different level of specificity among the same transactions in different institutional environments.

关 键 词： 专用性 契约安排制度环境交易费用 内生化

领　　域： [经济管理]