作　　者： ;

机构地区： 厦门大学管理学院

出　　处： 《金融研究》 2012年第5期179-192,共14页

摘　　要： 股权分置改革后,解禁股份减持中的内幕交易,成为全流通环境下大股东利益输送的新途径。本文以上市公司业绩预告前后的减持事件为研究对象,考察大股东利用信息优势的内幕交易问题。首先,在交易时点上,大股东倾向于在业绩预告披露"坏消息"之前、"好消息"之后出售股份;其次,在交易规模上,在业绩预告之前(后)出售股份时,业绩预告的利空(利好)程度越高,交易的规模也越大;最后,在业绩预告前减持时,正式业绩相对预告业绩的利空程度要大于在业绩预告后减持的情况,这在业绩预告为"好消息"的情况下尤为突出。这进一步证明了股东的信息优势,即股东的择时行为不仅基于业绩预告这一重大信息。 After equity division reform,insider trading during the sales of originally non-tradable shares would be the new form of tunneling in China.By investigating the sales of originally non-tradable shares around the earnings forecasts released,this paper studies the insider trading of originally non-tradable shareholders.The findings are as follows.Firsdy,the shareholders would like to sell shares before bad news released and after good news released.Secondly,if shares are sold before /after earnings forecasts released,the worse/better the news is the more shares would be traded.Finally,when shares are traded before earnings forecasts released, the difference between formal earnings and forecasting earnings will be worse than that of after earnings forecasts released.This means that shareholders time their trade based on not only the earnings forecast but also the prospect of future earnings,and demonstrates the information advantage of the insiders further.

关 键 词： 内幕交易 信息优势 业绩预告

领　　域： [文化科学]