作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 对外经济贸易大学金融学院

出　　处： 《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》 2012年第3期50-59,共10页

摘　　要： 银行业信贷市场永远是一个信息不完全的市场,研究银行业信贷市场永远都应以信息不完全为出发点。信号传递理论有效地解决了在这种环境下企业和银行的最优选择。总体而言,应该通过信号传递在信贷市场内部形成一个激励机制,这个激励机制的作用有两点:银行可以激励企业真实报告自己的信息,防止逆向选择;企业可以激励银行改进金融服务质量,提高工作效率。 The bank credit market will always be an incomplete information market. Coase pointed out that, due to the presence of transaction costs, the mar- ket is incomplete, otherwise there would not be the company s existence. There- fore, the researches on bank credit markets forever should be based on informa- tion incomplete as the starting point. Signaling theory could solve the optimal choice of enterprises and banks in this environment. Overall, this study pointed out that an incentive mechanism should be formed internally through the signal- ing theory. There are two roles of the incentive mechanism： firstly, banks can en- courage enterprises to report authentiec information to prevent adverse selection; secondly, enterprises can encourage banks to improve the quality of financial ser- vices and work efficiency.

关 键 词： 信号 银行 企业 信贷

领　　域： [经济管理]