作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 广东金融学院华南金融研究所

出　　处： 《财贸经济》 2012年第4期59-65,共7页

摘　　要： 我国各地债务融资结构存在很大差别,是当地的经济发展水平和金融市场格局不同导致吗?尤其是法律环境差的地区相对法律环境好的地区企业发债比率更高,有违经典的债务契约理论,这一悖论又如何解释?本文研究发现:(1)地方经济规模越大,对外依存度越高,当地企业发债越多;企业债券比银行贷款对通胀更敏感,而银行贷款是各地基础设施建设等固定投资的首选;(2)各地债券融资、银行贷款与股票融资在融资结构上此消彼长;(3)地方政府干预程度越高,当地企业发债比率越高。地方法律治理环境越完善,当地企业发债比率反而越低。其原因在于地方的政府干预是法律治理的替代机制,并且企业债券的发行受到更多的政府管制。 Provinces of China are significantly different in economic and financial development, degree of government intervention, financial market structure and legal environment. How these factors affect the debt structure of the region？ This paper analyzes regional debt financing structure based on panel data of provinces from 1998 to 2009. Firstly, the more developed local economy, the more enterprise bonds. Corporate bonds are more sensitive to inflation than bank loans, but bank loans are preferred over infrastructure. Secondly, the enterprise bond, bank loans and equity financing are alternatives to each other. Lastly, provincial debt structure is proportional to the degree of local government intervention, but is negatively correlated the degree of local law governance. It shows that government intervention is another alternative governance mechanism to legal environment, and corporate bond issuance is subject to more government constraints.

关 键 词： 债务结构 政府干预 法律治理

领　　域： [经济管理]