作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中国人民大学国际关系学院政治学系

出　　处： 《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》 2012年第2期140-147,共8页

摘　　要： 在国家治理的过程中,治理者是需要激励的群体。治理者作为掌握国家权力的群体,其行为被正式制度和非正式制度两种激励机制所驱动。比较而言,中国的国家治理者群体处在一种正式制度激励衰变而非正式制度激励效用增长的状态。这是中国治理者群体处于低绩效的治理窘境的主要原因。为此,将激励机制重新塑造为正式制度激励为主、非正式制度激励为辅的正常治理状况,就成为建构当代中国有效激励治理者积极作为机制的关键问题。而建构这一机制的前提,不是重建执政者所熟悉的道德化体制,而是要建构真正有利于激发治理者积极作为的法治化机制。 The national governance is currently under the alternative influence of two contradictory motivation mechanisms- motivations from formal and informal systems, which leads to the ineffective governance of ＂the public power for public use only. ＂ As soon as market economy was ushered in, national governors, who used to be in control of the national power, began to show the complicated motivation of their behaviors. That is, the governors in charge of public power also claim personal interests. They have their own priority between political ethics and economic claims. As long as the institutional motivation mechanism keeps producing decreased effects, the non-institutional motivation mechanism would grow rapidly without adequate means of institutional incentives.

关 键 词： 正式制度激励 非正式制度激励 国家治理 腐败 法治

领　　域： [经济管理]