作 者: ;
机构地区: 华东师范大学人文社会科学学院政治学系
出 处: 《华东经济管理》 2012年第5期131-133,共3页
摘 要: 转型期中国地方政府行为模式较为复杂,可以用重叠利益行动结构进行解释。地方政府多样化的行为表现,源自于其行为的利益归属区间的不同。在房地产调控领域,由于地方政府主要是根据自己的利益需要和本地区具体情况,按照重叠利益结构原理,对调控措施进行了巧妙的选择,结果保证了地方政府利益最大化,但未实现公共利益最大化。在公众无实质性制衡权力的情况下,改变地方政府行为模式的主要推手是中央政府。 The behavioral patlerns of local government are complex in the transformation period, which can be explained by overlapping interest model. Diversity of local government activities is result from the structure of benefits. In the fields of real estate, local governments are mainly based on their needs and interests of themselves and the region' s actual situation. The adjustment results ensure the maximum benefit of local government, but do not achieve the maximum interest of public. Only central government can change the behavior of local governments under the situation of non-control power of public.
领 域: [经济管理]