作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2012年第3期28-39,共12页

摘　　要： 对职工个人层面的研究表明,股权性质显著影响职工平均工资,但已有文献对于企业层面上股权性质如何影响职工平均工资尚缺乏深入探讨。以1999—2009年间我国A股上市企业为样本,本文深入考察了国有股权性质对职工平均工资的影响。研究结果表明,从整体上看,样本期间国有企业支付了更高的职工工资,而且这一结论在控制了行政垄断、企业规模和职工教育背景等因素之后依然成立。进一步区分国有企业控制级别和职工工资类别后发现,与非国有企业相比,国有企业普通职工工资显著更高。其中,中央政府控制的国有企业普通职工工资显著高于地方政府控制的国有企业,而地方政府控制的国有企业又显著高于非国有企业;国有企业高管薪酬与非国有企业并无显著差异,但中央政府控制的国有企业高管薪酬显著高于地方政府控制的国有企业和非国有企业。上述研究结论有助于理解转轨经济背景下国有股权性质对职工工资的影响,丰富了职工工资的相关研究,并对推进我国国有企业工资体制改革具有借鉴意义。 Although ownership is found as an important determinant factor to wage in a transition economy in the individual and macro level, there is little evidence about how ownership affect wage in firm level. Using a sample of A share listed firm from 1999 to 2009, this paper examines the impacts of ownership to wage differentials in firm level. This paper finds an significant SOE annual wage advantage after controlling for other firm characteristics. To be more specific, the results indicate that annual wage is significantly higher for common staffs of SOEs but not for managements. Differentiating central government controlled SOEs from local government controlled SOEs, we find that both the common staffs and managements of central government controlled SOEs get the highest wage. However, while common staffs of local government controlled SOEs get wage advantage over that of NSOEs, managements of local government controlled SOEs do not. Our findings are useful in explaining how ownership affects wage differentials in a transition economy, and will enrich the wage theory research.

关 键 词： 转轨经济 股权性质 工资差异

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]