作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 桂林电子科技大学信息科技学院信息与通信学院

出　　处： 《控制与决策》 2012年第3期441-445,共5页

摘　　要： 假设外界需求确定,充分考虑供应商管理库存(VMI)对于供应链的影响,通过建立经济效果模型证明了上游层面VMI可使供应链上游整体受益.在此基础上,依据Stackelberg博弈及纳什均衡等理论,构建实施上游层面VMI后3种情境下的利益分配机制.该机制可体现在供应商所供产品价格契约的制定上,此契约既能弥补供应商因管理制造商库存而增加的成本,又可使制造商的利润得到保障,实现供需方的互惠共赢,还可为博弈主方在价格层面制定激励政策提供理论依据. Supposing the demand definite, and considering the influence of VMI（vender managed inventory） on the parameters of supply chain, economic models are developed to demonstrate that the holistic supply chain of upriver lay can be beneficial in VMI mode of upriver lay. Based on this, profit distribution mechanism in 3 different environments is constructed according to Stackelberg Game and Nash Equilibrium theories. The mechanism is presented in the construction of price contracts of the productions supplied by accessory suppliers, in which the increased cost for accessory suppliers arising from managing manufacturer inventory can be offset, while the profit of manufacturer is ensured, so that win-win goal can be achieved. A theory reference in constituting price inspiriting strategies for game leader is offered.

关 键 词： 上游层面供应商管理库存模式 利益分配机制 确定需求 共赢

领　　域： [经济管理]