作　　者： ;

机构地区： 安徽科技学院

出　　处： 《安徽科技学院学报》 2011年第5期100-105,共6页

摘　　要： 本文在博弈论的理论框架内的研究农村正规金融、服务效率与非正规金融的关系,我们认为农户有两种可供选择的贷款途径:有政府控制农村正规金融市场和农村自己的非正规金融市场。这个分析过程使我们得到了一些结论:农户使用正规金融实际支付的价格等于农户使用非正规金融实际支付的价格;农产品价格补贴政策和增加农村可贷正规贷款额度政策都会使农户的农产品产量和利润都增加;但是在考虑农村正规金融机构金融服务机会成本后,农产品价格补贴政策将是最优的选择。 The paper probes into the relationship between formal credit, efficiency of financial service and infor- mal credit based on game theory. A farmer has two types of credit source： formal and informal. The supply of formal credit is controlled by officials, while the officials have no control over the informal. This analysis leads to some results, that effective price of formal credit is equal to the price of informal credit, that both agricultural pro- ductivity and the income of the farmer are increased, but that in the rural formal financial institutions to consider the opportunity costs of financial services, agricultural price subsidy policy would be the primal choice.

关 键 词： 博弈论 农村正规金融 服务效率 非正规金融

领　　域： [经济管理]