作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 广州大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》 2012年第1期50-56,共7页

摘　　要： 专利制度是基于保护和激励专利权人的一种制度设计,它赋予了专利权人对所拥有专利的垄断性排他权。当多个专利权人对某专利同时拥有部分专利权,且专利交叉授权难以进行时,破碎的产权之间便会产生相互制约关系。部分专利权人还运用沉睡专利的策略,无形扩大、滥用专利权,这些均造成了"专利丛林困境"。这样,专利的开发或商业化就会被阻隔,专利的闲置和浪费导致了"反公地悲剧"的出现。文章从反公地悲剧理论出发,研究了专利领域存在的丛林困境,认为专利池和强制许可等治理路径,可以作为化解专利丛林困境的有效选择。 As an incentive and a protection for the patentees, the patent system is designed to grant the patentees the exclusive monopoly right. When several patentees have common rights of one particular patent and cross - licensing can not seem to work, the fragmented property rights will constrain each other. Some patentees even take the advantage of sleeping patent strategy to expand and abuse the patent right, which brings about the patent jungle dilemma. As a result, the development or commercialization of the patents will be hampered, and the waste of them will finally lead to the emergence of ＂the tragedy of the anti - commons＂ Based on the theory of ＂the tragedy of the anti - commons＂, we do researches on thicket dilemma in the field of patent, pointing out that the paths such as patent pool and compulsory licenses can be regarded as effective choices to resolve the dilemma.

关 键 词： 反公地悲剧 专利丛林 沉睡专利 专利池 强制许可

领　　域： [社会学]