机构地区: 湖南有色金属股份有限公司长沙410015
出 处: 《价值工程》 2012年第6期111-112,共2页
摘 要: 本文主要研究机构投资者非理性报价行为。在发行人(发行人与承销商的统称)理性假设下,建立模型并研究了机构给出不同价值信号时的发行价格设定与机构获配情况。文中分析发现当机构投资者拥有好的价值信息时,发行人的报价约束是有效的;当其拥有不好的价值信息时,报价约束完全不起作用,机构投资者会蓄意传达无价值或是好的信号,造成新股价格高于其价值。 This paper is a study of the institutional investors' irrational bidding behavior.Under the rational issuer assumption,we establish a model and analyze the IPO price setting and institutions allocation under different value signals.Through analysis,we found that when the institutions have good value information,the issuer's offering constraint mechanism is effective;when they have bad information,quotation constraint mechanism entire uselessness,they would deliberately convey informative or good signals,causing the IPO price higher than its value.
领 域: [经济管理]