作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院

出　　处： 《系统科学与数学》 2011年第11期1467-1477,共11页

摘　　要： 构建了一个具强零售商和广告影响的闭环供应链博弈模型.首先在集中决策和分散决策两种决策模式下,分别探讨了闭环供应链的定价,广告投入和回收率决策,并分析了广告效应对节点企业各决策变量和利润的影响,以及对比了强零售商下不同回收渠道的优劣.其次,考察了通道费契约对具强零售商的闭环供应链的协调作用.主要结论为:1)与无广告效应相比,广告效应提升了闭环供应链的废旧品回收率,零售价和利润;2)强零售商下的最优回收模式为制造商回收;3)最优通道费与广告效应正相关,且通道费契约可以实现闭环供应链的良好协调. The closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) model with dominant retailer and advertising effect is studied.The centrally coordinated model and decentralized model are analyzed by using game theory.The pricing,advertising investment and return rate are studied,and the impact of advertising effect on the decision variable and profit of the CLSC system are analyzed,three different collecting modes are compared with each other,and the effect of slotting allowances on coordination of CLSC is studied.The results show that:1) all decision variable and profit of the node enterprise are positively correlated to advertising effect;2) the best collecting mode is that the manufacturer collects its products;3) the slotting allowances contract can coordinate the CLSC.

关 键 词： 广告 闭环供应链 协调 通道费

领　　域： [理学] [理学]